In a recent New Mexico case, the Court of Appeals held--not surprisingly to regular labor practitioners--that federal labor law preempts state law claims based on an allegation that a supervisory employee was improperly terminated from employment due to employer's suspicion that the employee was engaged in union-organizing activities. Humphries v. Pay and Save, Inc., 2011-NMCA-035, cert. not applied for. To the labor practitioner, it is only surprising that the state law claims were pursued at all.
Humphries, who also alleged he was a supervisor, had raised a number of legal claims, including: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of fair dealing; (3) negligent or intentional misrepresentation; (4) wrongful termination; and (5) tortious interference with contractual relations (against an individual member of management). However, at bottom all were based on the simple claim that he was terminated because of suspected union-related activities.
Why the case was brought at all is, frankly, a bit of a mystery, as it is axiomatic that the federal labor law completely preempts state law claims concerning any business or industry otherwise covered by the NLRA. Perhaps in over reliance on Section 301of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which gives federal courts express, exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes concerning the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements (CBA), the plaintiff had argued hat his claim was not preempted because his relationship was not governed by a CBA. However, the NLRA also comprises two other types of conflict preemption, both of which do apply here.
Under "Garmon preemption," the NLRA also preempts all claims that fall, or arguably fall, under the NLRA's "unfair labor practice" (ULP) provisions--meaning the NLRA preempts all state law to the extent it purports to regulate conduct already regulated by the NLRA. Obviously the claim that Humphries was dismissed due to union-related activities would constitute a ULP, if true, since such conduct would constitute interference with his collective bargaining rights. Moreover, even if there was doubt whether he was a covered employee or an excluded supervisor, the claim would still "arguably" fall under the NLRA and therefore be deferred to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in the first instance, under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
Finally, the claim is prevented even if it is clear that Mr. Humphries was a supervisor, under so-called "Machinists preemption." Humphries had additionally argued that because the NLRA did not cover supervisors, such supervisors could assert state law claims. However, it is also well established that the NLRA further preempts state law purporting to regulate conduct related to supervisors, who are intentionally omitted by Congress from the NLRA's coverage.
The purpose of omitting supervisors from the NLRA was to avoid an imbalance that would result in permitting supervisors to "serve two masters with opposed interests," and it would "flout the national policy ... to treat supervisors as employees." Humphries at ¶ 20, citing Beasley v. Food fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 US 653 (1974). Two years later, the Supreme Court made it point more broadly but forcefully, in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n ("Machinists"), 427 U.S. 132 (1976), stating the NLRA preempts state law purporting to regulate any practices or conduct intentionally omitted from the comprehensive federal scheme.
Hopefully the Humphries decision will put to rest,once and for all, state claims concerning issues regulated--directly or indirectly--by the NLRA.
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